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ABSTRACT
Understanding and characterizing the subspaces of adversarial examples aid in
studying the robustness of deep neural networks (DNNs) to adversarial perturba-
tions. Very recently, Ma et al. (2018) proposed to use local intrinsic dimensional-
ity (LID) in layer-wise hidden representations of DNNs to study adversarial sub-
spaces. It was demonstrated that LID can be used to characterize the adversarial
subspaces associated with different attack methods, e.g., the Carlini and Wagner’s
(C&W) attack and the fast gradient sign attack.
In this paper, we use MNIST and CIFAR-10 to conduct two new sets of exper-
iments that are absent in existing LID analysis and report the limitation of LID
in characterizing the corresponding adversarial subspaces, which are (i) oblivi-
ous attacks and LID analysis using adversarial examples with different confidence
levels; and (ii) black-box transfer attacks. For (i), we find that the performance
of LID is very sensitive to the confidence parameter deployed by an attack, and
the LID learned from ensembles of adversarial examples with varying confidence
levels surprisingly gives poor performance. For (ii), we find that when adversarial
examples are crafted from another DNN model, LID is ineffective in characteriz-
ing their adversarial subspaces. These two findings together suggest the limited
capability of LID in characterizing the subspaces of adversarial examples.
1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In recent years, many studies have shown that well-trained DNNs are quite vulnerable to adversarial
examples Szegedy et al. (2013); Goodfellow et al. (2015). To fundamentally understand the origins
of adversarial examples and to enhance the robustness of DNNs to adversarial perturbations, many
efforts have been put into differentiating adversarial and normal examples based on characterizing
the subspaces they reside in. For example, MagNet Meng & Chen (2017) uses an adversary detector
and a data reformer learned from the data manifold of natural examples for defending adversarial
examples, and it has demonstrated robust defense performance against the powerful C&W attack
under different confidence levels in the oblivious attack setting, where the adversarial examples are
generated from an undefended DNN and are oblivious to the deployed defenses on the same DNN.
More recently, Ma et al. (2018) proposed to characterize adversarial subspaces by using local intrin-
sic dimensionality (LID) Karger & Ruhl (2002); Houle et al. (2012). Given a reference sample x
generated by some distribution P , the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of LID is defined as
L̂ID(x) = −
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
log
ri(x)
rk(x)
)−1
, (1)
where ri(x) denotes the distance between x and its i-th nearest neighbor within a sample of points
drawn from P , and rk(x) denotes the maximum distance among k nearest neighbors. In Ma et al.
(2018), the MLE estimate of LID is separately applied to the layer-wise hidden representations of
DNNs (or simply the last (logits) layer) of adversarial and normal examples. When characterizing
adversarial subspaces, additional random perturbations are also included in the LID detector to dif-
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(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR-10
Figure 1: Visual illustration of adversarial examples crafted by different attack methods at confi-
dence κ = 20 in the transfer attack setting. Unsuccessful attacks detected by the respective LID-
detectors are marked by red cross sign. EAD Chen et al. (2017) can yield highly transferable and
visually similar adversarial examples, whereas the C&W attack Carlini & Wagner (2017) is less
likely to bypass the detector. The quantitative evaluation is presented in Table 1.
ferentiate random and adversarial perturbations. Although LID is proposed for subspace analysis
rather than defense, it exhibits strong discrimination power against five state-of-the-art attacks.
In this paper, in addition to the C&W attack, we also consider an untested attack called elastic-net
attacks to DNNs (EAD), an L1-distortion-based method proposed in Chen et al. (2017). EAD is a
generalized attack that includes the C&W attack as a special case when the L1 penalty coefficient
β = 0. In principle, larger β can generate more effective and transferable adversarial examples Chen
et al. (2017); Sharma & Chen (2017). We conduct two new sets of experiments that are absent in Ma
et al. (2018) and report the limitation of LID in characterizing the respective adversarial subspaces:
1. Oblivious attack with varying confidence. In Ma et al. (2018), for the C&W attack the adver-
sarial examples used to train the LID detector are those with the confidence parameter κ set to be
0, i.e., low-confidence adversarial examples. Although the recent work in Athalye et al. (2018) has
demonstrated that high-confidence (larger κ) adversarial examples can bypass the same detector, it
is not clear whether the detector can be strengthened if trained on high-confidence adversarial ex-
amples. Here we find that even the LID detector is trained using the same attack and confidence, at
low confidences its performance, in terms of AUC score Ma et al. (2018) and attack detection rate, is
only significant against C&W attack and is much less effective against EAD. Perhaps more surpris-
ingly, we trained the LID detector using ensembles of adversarial examples with varying confidence
levels and find that the resulting detector gives poor detection performance for all confidence levels.
2. Transfer attack. Adversarial examples are known to be transferable from one DNN model to
another Papernot et al. (2016); Liu et al. (2016). We find that when adversarial examples are crafted
from another DNN model (with similar classification accuracy), LID trained using the same attack
and confidence on the target model is still ineffective in characterizing adversarial subspaces at high
confidences, especially for L1-norm-based adversarial examples crafted by EAD. Figure 1 shows
some visual comparison of adversarial examples crafted by C&W attack and EAD in this setting.
Our findings suggest the limited capability of LID in characterizing the subspaces of adversarial
examples. In particular, without knowing the attack parameters, in the oblivious attack setting the
performance of LID detector can be severely degraded. In the transfer attack setting, even knowing
the attack parameters, LID appears to overlook the subspaces of transferable adversarial examples.
2 EXPERIMENTS
2.1 EXPERIMENT SETUP AND PARAMETER SETTING
We use MNIST and CIFAR-10 to perform untargeted adversarial attacks in the aforementioned ex-
periments. 1000 correctly classified images are randomly selected from the test sets as attack targets.
In the oblivious attack setting, we use the DNN models1 provided by Ma et al. (2018). In the transfer
attack setting, we use different DNN models2 in Carlini & Wagner (2017) to craft adversarial exam-
ples. For EAD attack, we use the default implementation3 and set the L1 regularization coefficient
1https://github.com/xingjunm/lid adversarial subspace detection
2https://github.com/carlini/nn robust attacks.
3https://github.com/ysharma1126/EAD Attack
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Table 1: Transfer attacks on LID-based subspace analysis trained with the same attack and confi-
dence on the target model. Detection rate means the attacks detected by the respective detectors.
MNIST CIFAR-10
Attack
method
κ detection
rate (%)
classification rate (%)
(post detection)
classification rate
w/o detection (%)
detection
rate (%)
classification rate (%)
(post detection)
classification rate
w/o detection (%)
C&W(L2)
0 25.90 73.48 98.89 1.01 95.28 96.30
10 39.41 54.93 90.42 9.68 87.26 94.52
20 34.67 36.79 57.96 16.05 79.49 90.95
30 38.10 11.08 23.38 17.45 75.92 88.15
40 36.29 2.31 5.24 17.70 72.73 84.45
EAD
(EN rule)
0 38.20 59.37 94.65 14.52 81.14 93.63
10 47.47 33.56 64.51 15.41 78.21 88.28
20 36.29 15.32 28.72 21.78 68.66 81.78
30 29.43 4.73 8.16 21.14 65.09 77.45
40 31.25 0.80 1.81 23.43 57.19 69.29
EAD
(L1 rule)
0 38.70 58.66 94.65 6.24 88.91 93.63
10 47.68 34.37 64.91 16.81 77.83 88.02
20 35.68 15.32 27.82 19.10 71.46 83.69
30 30.04 5.44 9.27 22.03 62.42 75.66
40 31.35 0.90 1.91 22.42 58.47 70.70
β = 0.1. We also report the EAD attack results using different decision rules (elastic-net (EN) or L1
distortion) in selecting adversarial examples. For C&W attack, we use its default setting2. The con-
fidence level κ of C&W attack an EAD is picked from the range of [0, 40]. For training LID-based
detectors, we use the default setting1 in Ma et al. (2018) using all DNN layers and set the number of
neighbors k = 20 and use a minibatch of size 100. Note that in the following experiments, unless
specified, the LID detectors are trained with the same attacks and the same confidence levels, which
already weakens the attack capability in the best plausible way. All experiments are conducted using
an Intel Xeon E5-2620v4 CPU, 125 GB RAM and a NVIDIA TITAN Xp GPU with 12 GB RAM.
2.2 EVALUATION OF OBLIVIOUS ATTACKS ON LID-BASED SUBSPACE ANALYSIS
We report that even if the LID detectors are trained with the same attack and confidence κ, the
respective detectors, in most cases, can only detect less than 50% of the adversarial examples on
CIFAR-10 and around 35 − 60% on MNIST. At a low confidence (κ = 0), on CIFAR-10 the LID
detector can detect roughly 89% of adversarial examples from C&W attack, but can only detect 42%
of those from EAD with the EN decision rule. Both the area under curve (AUC) score used in Ma
et al. (2018) and the detection rate tend to drop significantly as the confidence increases, especially
when κ = 20 and 30. The complete results are presented in Table 2 of the supplementary material.
We proceed to check if a LID detector can be made more robust when trained with the same attack
and ensembles of confidence κ = {0, 10, 20, 30, 40} when crafting adversarial examples. Interest-
ingly and perhaps surprisingly, when compared to LID detector using single κ, we find that training
with more adversarial examples (5 times more in this case) of different confidences actually ruins its
performance. The detection rates and the AUC scores on these two datasets are consistently below
45% and 85% for all attacks, respectively, and the AUC score of MNIST is much lower than that of
CIFAR-10. The complete results are presented in Table 3 of the supplementary material.
2.3 EVALUATION OF TRANSFER ATTACKS ON LID-BASED SUBSPACE ANALYSIS
Table 1 shows that when LID is used in adversary detection, its detection rate can be further de-
creased by transfer attacks, even if the detectors are trained with the same attack and confidence
on the target model. On MNIST, when κ = 40 the detection rate of EAD is around 31% and its
post-detection classification rate of undetected attacks is less than 1%. On CIFAR-10, EAD exhibits
better attack transferability than C&W attack in terms of the post-detection classification rate.
3 CONCLUSION
We summarize the main results of this paper as follows:
1. Even at low confidences and given complete attack parameters for analysis, LID is still ineffective
in characterizing the subspaces of L1-distortion-based adversarial examples crafted by EAD.
2. LID-based subspace analysis using ensembled confidence training leads to worse performance.
3. LID has limited capability in characterizing the subspaces of transferable adversarial examples.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Table 2: Oblivious attacks on LID-based subspace analysis trained with the same attack and confi-
dence κ on MNIST and CIFAR-10. AUC and detection rate mean the area under curve (%) and the
fraction of attacks (%) detected by the respective detectors.
MNIST CIFAR-10
Attack method κ AUC score detection rate AUC score detection rate
C&W(L2)
0 89.19 58.56 99.05 89.17
10 85.99 53.83 93.87 65.35
20 78.61 36.79 83.24 43.18
30 77.75 31.45 82.87 43.31
40 81.94 48.89 82.87 40.38
EAD
(EN rule)
0 87.85 60.38 82.22 42.92
10 84.48 53.52 92.31 60.38
20 78.98 36.49 87.11 46.87
30 78.23 35.28 82.90 44.33
40 81.97 45.56 82.86 41.27
EAD
(L1 rule)
0 87.96 58.16 93.85 64.71
10 85.18 51.91 87.15 49.80
20 78.79 38.40 84.58 43.56
30 78.47 35.98 81.42 41.52
40 82.99 49.49 83.00 41.65
Table 3: Oblivious attacks on LID-based subspace analysis trained with the same attack and ensem-
bles of confidence κ = {0, 10, 20, 30, 40} on MNIST and CIFAR-10. AUC and detection rate mean
the area under curve (%) and the fraction of attacks (%) detected by the respective detectors.
MNIST CIFAR-10
Attack method κ AUC score detection rate AUC score detection rate
C&W(L2)
0 82.75 44.75 84.18 44.58
10 82.30 44.75 83.18 43.05
20 76.19 31.14 82.24 42.67
30 75.10 31.85 82.00 43.69
40 77.62 39.21 82.09 41.65
EAD
(EN rule)
0 82.46 44.35 82.95 42.92
10 81.54 44.75 82.90 43.05
20 76.37 31.95 83.66 43.31
30 73.49 31.55 82.57 44.58
40 75.29 36.89 83.39 43.05
EAD
(L1 rule)
0 82.41 44.85 82.67 42.67
10 82.47 44.95 82.99 43.69
20 75.68 31.14 82.55 43.56
30 73.67 30.84 81.49 42.42
40 76.04 37.19 82.10 42.80
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